The inactivities of employer unions by Brosnan, Peter et al.
New Zealand journal of industrial relations, 1985, 10, 141-156 
The inactivities of employer unions 
Peter Brosnan*, Pat Walsh* and Philip Rowe** 
This paper reports the results of a survey of New Zealand employer unions. It is found 
that 1nany e1nployer unions are completely inactive. Those that are active are little 
inclined to hold meetings and fevv provide a range of senJices to members. The most active 
employer unions are those attached to a trade association and/or with their own office 
separate from the New Zealand h .. mployers Federation. 
Introduction 
Until the 1970s, the study of employers, their organisations and indeed management 
itself was a relatively neglected area in industrial relations. This was despite the vast 
literature in other disciplines such as sociology, psychology or management studies which 
examined employers in great detail. In a wide-ranging review of the study of manag~ement 
in British industrial relations, Wood (1982) focussed upon this neglect and evaluated 4 
general reasons which were often put forward to explain it. He dismissed as naive the 
belief that to study employers is to be seen as supporting them, and as untrue the argument 
that employer suspicion of academic research n1akes it more difficult to get access to data 
that when studying trade unions (Wood, 1982, p. 52). 
Wood laid more stress upon 2 other reasons, both of them connected with the develop-
ment of industrial relations as an academic discipline. The pioneers were scholars in 
industrial relations who were sympathetic to the early struggles of trade unions and thus 
focussed their attention on unions. As unions gradually won their battles for ,existence, 
however, the emphasis shifted away from studying institutions per se to the emerging 
relations between unions and employers, and especially the operation of collective bar-
gaining procedures. As a result, the study of employers themselves never took centre 
stage in the discipline. Wood argued that the continued neglect of employers in later years 
stemmed from the acceptance by subsequent generations of industrial relations researchers · 
of the dominant values of capitalist societies. Trade unions were seen as a problem, as 
something that required explanation, and - it might be added - in many cases as much-
maligned institutions in need of defence. In contrast, management and employers were, 
for the most part, not seen in this way. Instead, they tend,ed to enter the pictur,e largely 
because of their relations with unions and governments, and not as subjects for study 
in their own right. 
In the 1970s, these attitudes changed quite dramatically. In the United Kingdom 
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the stimulus to change was the emergence of a widely held belief that management was an 
issue for industrial relations researchers, and that it could no longer be taken as a given 
needing no explanation. The report of the Donovan Royal Commission (1968) contri-
buted greatly to the development of these new perceptions of the role of employers and 
management in industrial relations. The Donovan Commission laid a substantial portion 
of the blame for the swift development in the 1960s of the "informal" system of industrial 
relations and the associated fragmentation of the formal system at the door of management: 
-
Unofficial strikes are above all the result of the inadequate conduct of indultrlal relations 
at company and plant level. They wDl persist 10 lous as companies pay taadequate atten-
tion to their pay structures aDCl peraonnel policies, and the methods of negotiation 
adopted at the workplace remain in their present chaotic state (Donovaa, 1968, p. 121). 
The Royal Commission's recommendation that British employers move to develop 
coherent company level industrial relations and personnel policies made the role of em-
ployers in industrial relations an issue of public policy. The Heath Government's Industrial 
Relations Act, 1971, may be seen as a vain effort to construct a framework that would 
encourage the development of these new managerial industrial relations policies (Moran, 
1977). The extraordinary outcomes of that ill fated legislation helped to turn the role 
of employers into an increasingly important issue in industrial relations research (McCarthy 
and Ellis, 1973). This trend subsequently received a further boost by a second major 
report on British industrial relations, that of the Bullock Committee of Inquiry on Indus-
trial Democracy (Bullock, 1977). As Winchester observes, the debate over the Bullock 
Report focussed widespread attention upon the key strategic role in industrial relations 
of employers, particularly through its recommendation that worker directors be estab-
lished to give employees participation in major strategic decisions (Winchester, 1983, 
p. 1 07). Given the controversial nature of the Bullock recommendations, it is not sur-
prising that experiments in industrial democracy, and the impact they had on management 
strategy gave rise to considerable research (Brannen et al., 1976; Chiplin et al., 1977; and 
Bat stone et al., 1983). 
Within this rapidly developing area of research into management and employers, 2 
broad approaches can be identified. The fust approach is to examine the strategic choices 
made by management in their pursuit of control in industrial relations. These strategic 
choices take place at 2 levels, at the workplace and in the wider corporate setting. There 
is already a substantial literature dealing with management strategies in the workplace, 
and the particular patterns of worker resistance which result (Batstone et al., 1977, 1978; 
Brown, 1981; Purcell, 1981; Edwards and Sullion, 1982). For the most part this literature 
has been UK based, whereas the analysis of management strategy in the wider corporate 
setting draws on both American and British research (Tim perley, 1980; Purcell, 1983; 
Thurley and Wood, 1983; Kochan, McKersie and Cappelli, 1984; Cappelli, 1985). This 
research has been highly innovative and very challenging for the discipline of industrial 
relations. It argues that industrial relations decisions are just one component of a wider 
corporate strategy and can only be understood in terms of their relationship with fmancial, 
production marketing and all other corporate considerations. This approach redefines 
what industrial relations is and implies radical change to the subject matter of industrial 
relations research. 
The second broad approach to the study of management in industrial relations is to 
study employers' organisations. However, this area of research is still not well developed. 
This is despite Clegg's argument that the collective bargaining system in any country is 
strongly influenced by the structure and attitudes of employers' associations and manage-
ment (1976, p. I 0). Much less is known about employer organisations than about worker 
unions, although in recent years there have been efforts to remedy this (Jackson and 
Sisson, 1976; Sisson, 1977, 1983; Plowman, 1978), and 1984 saw the publication of a 
comparative study of employers' associations in 10 countries (Windmuller and Gladstone, 
1984). 
All the preceding comments concerning the neglect of employers in industrial relations 
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research apply forcefully to New Zealand. Other than their inclusion in general studies 
of industrial relations, employers have scarcely been studied at all. The only analysis of 
any substance has been by Rudman ( 1974). To follow the approach of studying the 
strategic industrial relations decisions of individual companies would require a large-
scale commitment of research funds, which, so far at least~ has not been forthcoming in 
New Zealand. However, it has been possible to follow the second broad approach, namely 
to study employer associations. In 1982-83, 2 surveys were conducted of employer 
unions and associations. In this article we report on some of the results of those surveys. 
Employer organisations in New Zealand 
As with worker unions, the development of employer unions in New Zealand has been 
heavily influenced by the provisions of industrial legislation. The major impetus to the 
growth of employer unions has been the enactment of legislation to further the growth and 
activities of trade unions. There have been 2 stages to this. The first employer associations, 
formed after the Maritime Strike, fell into decline in the 1890s but were revived in the 
early 1900s once the effects of the 1894 Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act began 
to make themselves felt. Between 1901 and 1911 the number of registered employer 
unions grew from 68 to 118, while total membership more than doubled from 1 824 to 
4 251 (Rudman, 1974, p. 70). The sudden growth in employer unions was a direct result 
of the recovery of worker unions under the protection of the arbitration system, and the 
need for employers to be represented in conciliation proceedings and before the Arbitra-
tion Court. 
The second phase of employer union development followed the restoration of compul-
sory arbitration and the introduction of compulsory membership of trade unions in 1936. 
The situation had altered very little between 1911 and 1935, with the number of unions 
rising from 118 to 131 and total membership from 4 251 to 4 344. However, with worker 
unions granted complete jurisdiction over all industries and occupations, and with auto-
matic access to the Arbitration Court, thousands of employers who had previously enjoyed 
a union-free existence hastened to join or, if necessary, to form an employer union. 
Between 1935 and 1937 the number of employer unions increased to 239 and total mem-
bership to 8 441 (Rudman, 1974, p. 70). Since then, the number of unions has been fairly 
stable, while total membership has of course risen steadily. At 31 December 1984, there 
were 15 employer associations and 222 employer unions, with the total union membership 
being 39 771 (Department of Labour, 1985, pp. 83-88). 
Various employer unions are affiliated to the New Zealand Employers' Federation 
(NZEF) - the central organisation of employers - either directly or through one of the 
federation's regional divisions. The NZEF was established in 1902 to coordinate the res-
ponse of employers to the growth of worker unions after the passage of the Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act. The NZEF acts as the representative of employers in 
dealings with the Government and in any General Wage Order hearings. It also provides 
research and advisory services to its members. The most important service offered by the 
NZEF has been the provision of advocates to represent employer unions in award negotia-
tions, and to assist in other disputes. The staff of the NZEF in fact administer many 
employer unions directly from their own office. We will explore this relationship below. 
The NZEF has become increasingly important during the last 20 years. To a large 
extent, this has followed inevitably from the rising level of government intervention in 
the industrial relations system. The NZEF has been required to deal with the Government 
on a continual basis and to represent employers in key bipartite and tripartite negotiations. 
A further reason for the increased importance of the NZEF has been the growing need for 
it to coordinate employers' wage bargaining policies as a consequence of the more frag-
mented bargaining system that has prevailed since the 1960s (Walsh, 1984a). In response 
to these and other considerations, the NZEF underwent major structural reform in the 
early 1970s. The reform was initiated principally by the Manufacturers Federation which, 
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along with other employer organisations felt the NZEF was not effectively representing 
their interests (Rudman, 1974, p. 72). The reforms gave representation on the NZEF 
National Executive to the Manufacturers Federation, the Chamber of Commerce and 
Federated Farmers, as well as to other specified employer sectors. These changes helped 
resolve the sometimes difficult relationship between the NZEF and other peak employer 
organisations. 
The central role of the NZEF, especially in wage negotiations, raises the question of 
what it is that employer unions do. Certainly, they have never been viewed as a highly 
active or dynamic component of the industrial relations system. As we shall see, a great 
many are not independent organisations in their own right, but are attached to the NZEF 
(or 1 of its 4 regional divisions) or to a trade association. Indeed, Rudman describes them 
as "shadow" organisations (1974, p. 68). Nonetheless, they have existed for almost 100 
years and they carry out functions of great importance to their members and to worker 
unions, for without an appropriate employer union, creating a dispute of interest to 
obtain an award and its blanket coverage is more difficult. Yet, very little is known about 
them. In this article we hope to cast some light on the activities of the registered employer 
• 
untons. 
Our analysis below is restricted to employer unions registered under the Industrial 
Relations Act. However, we do acknowledge that there are some employer unions which 
operate despite not being registered. The Bankers Association is one of these. Another, 
which we refer to below, is the National Association of Retail Grocers and Supermarkets 
(NARGON). There are possibly others but we have no satisfactory method of identifying 
these organisations. 
The surveys 
The structure of the surveys was complicated in that most industrial unions of em-
ployers {IUOEs) do not operate independently. Some operate out of the same office as 
a trade association. These we term bifunctional unions. Some operate out of the New 
Zealand Employers Federation (NZEF) offices or from the office of one of the regional 
associations. Furthermore, some unions are federated into industrial associations of 
employers (IAOEs). This last fact produced an additional complication in that it was not 
obvious which body should be regarded as the principal organisation. There were 13 of 
these IAOEs at the time of the survey.1 They were all industry-based and together they 
affiliated 1 05 IUOEs. It was clear from the outset that, in at least some cases, the IAOE 
was the effective organisation and that the constituent IUOEs were merely the means by 
which individual employers could belong to the IAOE. 
Accordingly , it was decided to conduct 2 surveys; the first covered those IUOEs 
which belonged to IAOEs and the second centred on IAOEs and unaffiliated IUOEs. 
The 2 surveys were similarly structured in that each IUOE or IAOE was sent 2 question-
naires and a covering sheet which asked "Does your union have a parallel trade association 
operating out of the same premises?". If the answer was ''yes", they were asked to fill 
in the longer of the 2 questionnaires and which included questions about the relationship 
between the IUOE or IAOE and the trade association. If the answer was "no", the simpler 
questionnaire was completed. The 2 questionnaires in the first survey were slightly longer 
again since they had additional questions on the relationship between the IUOE and its 
lAO E. 
The surveys were conducted by mail mainly during 1982-1983 and every IUOE and 
IAOE registered at 31 December 1981 was sent the relevant questionnaires. Follow-up 
1 A fourteenth IAOE, the New Zealand Asaociation of Waterfront Employers was registered on 
1 July 1982. However, we based our survey on the list of unions in the Department of Labour's 
Annual Report to March 1982 and thus we did not survey that IAOE. Instead, we surveyed the 
2 IUOEs which belonged to it. See infra. 
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letters and questionnaires were sent to those organisations which did not reply to the 
initial mail-out. If thls still did not produce a reply, a third letter and set of questionnaires 
was sent and followed up, where possible, with a phone call. 
The first survey: JUOEs affiliated to IAOEs 
The final response rates to the first survey are given in Table 1. Table 2 gives the · 
response rates to the second survey. It will be seen that the first survey had a much lower 
response rate than the second. The response rate to the first survey, in terrns of IUOEs, 
was 54.7 percent. In terms of member firms, the response rate was 57.7 percent. In 
contrast , the second survey had a virtually complete response. As Table 2 shows, 97.6 
percent of all IAOEs and unaffiliated lUGEs responded and between them they directly 
or indirectly represented 99.7 percent of all members of registered employer unions. 
Table 1 : Coverage of first survey and distribution of respondents 
Active 
Location of office IUOEs 
With trade asoociation 
AtNZEF 4 
Not at NZEF 24 
Not with trade association 
AtNZEF 2 
Not at NZEF 13 
Subtotal 43 
No reply 
Total 
Member 
fums 
297 
1 431 
51 
738 
2 517 
IUOEs 
1 
6 
3 
5 
15 
Inactive 
Member 
firms 
225 
303 
32 
63 
623 
IUOEs 
5 
30 
5 
18 
58 
48 
106 
Total 
Member 
firms 
522 
1 734 
83 
801 
3 140 
2 302 
5 442 
Table 2: Coverage of second survey and distribution of respondents 
Active Inactive Total 
Location of office IAOEs 
IAOEs Unaffiliated Member Unaffiliated Member and Member 
IUOEs firms IUOEs flfms IUOEs firms 
With trade 
as~ciation 
At NZEF 1 6 1 063 1 203 8 l 266 
Not at NZEF 7 45 22 292 7 1 366 59 23 658 
Not with 
trade association 
AtNZEF 4 26 6 008 4 44 34 6 052 
Not at NZEF 1 14 2 936 6 292 21 3 228 
Subtotal 13 91 32 299 18 1 905 122 34 204 
No reply 3 115 
Total 125 34 319 
• 
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At first sight, the difference in response rates to the 2 surveys is rather surprising. 
When we examine the results of the fust survey, however, we find that most IUOEs which 
are affiliated to IAOEs have practically no life of their own. As Table 1 shows, 1 S of the 
58 IUOEs which replied to the survey were completely inactive. Virtually all of the 
remaining 43 indicated low levels of activity. Fifteen (not necessarily the same 1 S who 
were completely inactive) of the responding IUOEs claimed not to take part in award 
negotiations and only 3 took part in negotiations independently of the IAOE to which 
they were affiliated. Perhaps coincidentally, these 3 were all located in the Otago-
Southland area. A common response was that the IUOE existed to pro.vide an information 
flow of local views to the IAOE and/or to produce a local assessor for the IAOE's award 
negotiations. There were some IUOEs which provided advice to members and a small 
number offered a range of services. Outside of some involvement in the IAOE's award 
negotiations, the only other significant sign of local activity was involvement in appren-
ticeship matters and representation on apprenticeship committees. 
The replies indicated that many regarded themselves as sleeping organisations. Typical 
comments were : "The IUOE is not operative. We rely on the association" or, "We exist 
only in case there is a local dispute but there has not been one for many years" or, ''We 
are only a paper organisation" or again, ''We meet only in emergencies" or, ''The union 
holds no funds". One IUOE responded ''We have been trying for many years to have the 
union dissolved". 
It was clear in many cases that the IUOE secretary had virtually no knowledge of 
industrial matters. Some even required convincing that we were interested in the 
employers' union rather than the workers' union. This lack of industrial orientation was 
obvious from some questionnaires, while, in other cases, the secretary contacted us by 
telephone and confessed his or her lack of knowledge or involvement in industrial matters. 
In some cases the secretaries were public accountants who merely acted as a post office for 
the IUOE. In some other cases the secretary sent the questionnaires to the IAOE for 
completion. 
In general, the IUOEs were such artificial organisations that it was difficult for the 
secretaries of bifunctional IUOEs to distinguish the separate legal existence of the IUOE 
and the trade association from whose premises it operated. This difficulty was so great 
that we suspect that some of the IUOEs counted in the first colum of Table I as not having 
a parallel trade association did have one but that the secretaries interpreted the question 
as meaning a second trade association beyond the one which shadowed the IUOE. 
As far as the 35 which claimed to be bifunctional are concerned, the subordinate 
nature of the IUOE was very plain. In nearly every case, the trade association officers 
held equivalent positions in the IUOE. A number of responding secretaries felt the need 
to point out that the IUOE meetings were held in conjunction with the trade association's. 
In some cases, they were held immediately afterwards and lasted for periods of 3-10 
minutes. In other cases, they were held simultaneously with 2 minute books and some 
matters being entered as trade association minutes and some as IUOE minutes. It was 
certainly clear that trade association matters dominated the meetings. Despite this how-
ever, one secretary commented that the "IUOE is used at the moment .as a debt collecting 
agency to gather in the fees owing to" the trade association. What he meant was tliat the 
possibility of worker union activity was used as a threat to coerce employers into joining 
the IUOE through membership of the trade association. 
This is not to say that there were no IUOEs which appeared quite active. Not sur-
prisingly, the most active were those which were not at the NZEF. Often these were 
regional branches of trade associations such as the Hotel Association of New Zealand or 
Master builders, plumbers or painters. Some of these IUOEs appeared to handle local 
disputes without reference to the IAOE and claimed to offer advice and other assistance to 
members. It was also of interest to note that the level of local activity varied among the 
IUOEs affiliated to the same IAOE. In general, the larger IUOEs were more active but 
this was not always so and it appeared that the competence of the secretary may have been 
e 
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a factor determining the level of activity of individual IU~OEs. 
What of the 48 IUOEs \Vhich did not reply to our survey? Given the contrasting 
levels of response to our 2 surveys and the lo\v level of activity which generally prevailed 
among respondents to the first survey (not to mention the ignorance of industrial matters 
by many secretaries), it seems reasonable to assume that the level of activity among non-
responding IUOEs would be as low as among responding IUOEs but, in all probability, a 
good deal lower. In view of the low level of response and of activity a1nong IUOEs 
affiliated to IAOEs, we decided to treat the IAOE as the effective union for the purposes 
of analysis and to concentrate on the results of the second survey. In the analysis which 
follows, we shall refer to IUOEs and IAOEs collectively as "unions" or "employer unions". 
The second survey : !A DEs and unaffiliated JUOEs 
• 
As we noted above, the second survey covered all IAOEs and IUOEs which did not 
belong to an IAOE. We refer to these collectively as Hunions". The distribution of these 
unions is given by Table 2. Compared with the IUOEs responding to the first survey, we 
note that the independent IUOEs are more likely to be located at the NZEF but marginally 
less likely to be at the same address as a trade association (bifunctional unions). One half 
are bifunctional and roughly one third are at the NZEF. They are also much more likely 
to be active. All13 IAOEs were active and 91 out of 112 unaffiliated IUOEs were definitely 
active (compared with 43 out of 106 affiliated IUOEs). 
Administrative location 
Table 2 reveals a complicated relationship among employer unions., the NZEF and its 
regional divisions and the various trade associations. Indeed, from Table 2, we can see that 
employer organisations fall into 4 categories. The largest category are those bifunctional 
unions not at the NZEF (or one of its regional divisions). These comprise 59 of the 122 
unions which replied to our second survey. The second largest category (34 of 122) were 
single function unions whose office was at the NZEF. There were 21 organisations in the 
third category, those single function unions whose offices were separate from the NZEF, 
and, finally, 8 bifunctional unions who were located at the NZEF. Organisational size 
seen1s to be a factor in accounting for this distribution. The sn1al1er the employer union, 
the more likely it is to be attached to the NZEF. On average, NZEF-based unions are only 
half the size of the remainder. Similarly, the average membership of bifunctional unions 
is twice the size of single function unions. 
The pattern in Table 2 (and Table 1) highlights the different nature of New Zealand's 
worker unions and employer unions, despite the virtually identical legislation under which 
they operate and the many similar functions they perform. Although a great many worker 
unions are very limited in their resources and capacities, they do at least retain an indepen-
dent life of their own. No worker union is run directly by the FOL or its district regional 
councils. Even the phenomenon of multiple union secretaryships is in decline. By 
contrast, the vast bulk of employer unions are run by a trade association or the NZEF, 
with only 21 respondents claiming to be independent of both. On closer inspection, 
however, even this limited sign of independent employer unions proves misleading. Six 
were inactive - a higher proportion than any other category. Very few of the other 15 
were significant organisations. Four were unions for la\vyers or accountants, while others 
included unions representing relatively minor employer groups such as the Dunedin Master 
Tailors, the Canterbury Master Plasterers and the Wellington Provincial Tobacconists and 
Registered Hairdressers. Indeed, according to the responses to our survey, there are only 
4 registered employer unions of major importance operating independently of the NZEF 
or a trade association. These are the employer unions in the pulp and paper and cleaning 
industries, on the waterfront and amongst retail butchers. 
At first sight, the lg.cation of so many employer organisations at a trade association-
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what we tenn bifunctional organisations - may seetn surprising. Although it is by no 
n1eans unknown in other countries for one organisation to embrace both roles, the distinc-
tion between employers' trade and industrial relations interests has tended in other coun-
tries to lead to the formation of 2 different organisations. Windmuller ( 1984, p. 2) points 
out that trus ''organisational dualism" allowed employers to _ choose whether to cooperate 
with others on either trade or industrial matters, while retaining autonomy in the other 
area. It also ensured that wider economic issues remained the province of the trade rather 
than the employer association, thus helping to keep those issues out of the industrial 
sphere. However, these reasons for preserving the trade and employer associations as 
separate organisations were not as relevant in New Zealand as elsewhere. Historically, 
under the blanket coverage award system, there was little incentive for individual 
employers to retain autonomy in industrial relations, regardless of whether they co-
operated in trade matters. Indeed, as the case noted earlier highlighted, trade associations 
are able to exploit the importance of being represented in award negotiations to persuade 
employers to join. Secondly, the narrow definition of ''industrial matters'' prevented trade 
unions from intruding into wider trade and economic questions. Consequently, there was 
not the same need in New Zealand as in other countries for separate trade and employer 
associations (cf. Rudman, 1974, p. 69). 
As well as these, there are advantages to employers in merging their trade and indus-
trial relations organisations. The most obvious advantage is the cost-saving involved. 
Indeed, Windmuller suggests that economies of scale may be a factor in an emerging trend 
in some countries towards the amalgamation of trade and employer associations (Wind-
muller, 1984, p. 8). The merging of the 2 organisations also enables both trade and 
industrial relations considerations to be taken into account in employer decisions and 
public statements. This means that the knowledge and experience of employers in a par-
ticular occupation or industry can be brought to bear upon industrial relations issues 
through their trade association. In addition, the permanent staff of the trade association 
can apply their own specialised expertise to the problems of industrial relations. 
One major implication of the widespread merging of trade associations and employer 
organisations in New Zealand is that it allows an alternative perspective to that of the 
NZEF to be heard in employer circles. Since very few employer groups are able to main-
tain a genuinely independent industrial relations organisation, their choice essentially is 
whether they wish the activities of their employer union to be carried out by a trade 
association or by the NZEF. Although there were 7 bifunctional IUOEs and 1 bifunctional 
IAOE located at the NAEF, in the vast majority of cases the location of an employer union 
at a trade association ensured it remained detached from the NZEF. This did not mean 
it escaped the influence of the federation entirely. As we shall see below, almost all 
employer organisations use the services of a federation advocate. Many also call on the 
NZEF for advice on other matters including the selection of its own assessors in award 
negotiations. 
The separation of bifunctional unions from the NZEF has prevented the development 
of a federation monopoly over the industrial relations organisation of New Zealand's 
employers, a monopoly which the federation may view as a mixed blessing. It has also 
ensured the presentation of alternative views and policies, informed by a deeper under-
standing of the industry or occupation concerned than could usually be offered by a 
member of the NZEF staff. It may also, in exceptional circumstances, allow a particular 
group of employers to prevail in a contlict of views with the NZEF, as happened in 1985 
during the negotiation of the electrical contractors' award. Other recent examples would 
include the negotiation of the drivers' award in 1979 (which sparked the first threatened 
use of the Remuneration Act and led directly to the General Strike) (Walsh and McMaster, 
1980), and the introduction over NZEF opposition of various qualification payments for 
tradespeople, especially in the engineering and electrical industries during the 1970s 
(Walsh, 1984b). 
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Inactive IUOEs 
The second survey found 18 IUOEs which were inactive in the sense of not being 
involved in award negotiations and not providing services to members. Although these 
inactive IUOEs comprise 14 percent of all IAOEs, they represent only 6 percent of mem-
ber firms. These inactive IUOEs can be divided into 4 groups. Two groups while 
nominally inactive were not really so. The fust group comprised only one IUOE, the New 
Zealand Municipalities IUOE. This organisation was registered early in 1982 and, when 
contacted, had not yet been involved in negotiations but it clearly intended to do so. 
The second group comprised 8 grocery IUOEs. These IUOEs stated that they were 
represented in negotiations by the National Association of Retail Grocers and Super-
markets of New Zealand Inc. (NARGON). NARGON clearly fills the role of an IAOE but, 
since it is not registered as such the individual IUOEs or supermarkets are nominally 
the respondents in award proceedings. Although NARGON completed our questionnaire, 
their responses are not included in the tables which follow. It is clear from its replies, 
however, that NARGON is one of the more active employer unions. 
The third group of inactive IUOEs comprised 3 that declared themselves to be defunct. 
One of these, the Northern Steamship Company, is now in the process of having its regis-
tration cancelled. The other 2, however, did submit returns for 1984 to the Department 
of Labour. 
The fourth group comprised 6 IUOEs that were not active currently but kept their 
organisation registered in case it should be required in the future. An interesting illus-
tration of this is found in the reply of one of these organisations, the North Canterbury 
American Type Threshing Mill and Header Harvester Owners IUOE. They replied that 
their organisation had been formed in the mid-1920s when the English wooden thresh-
ing mills had been replaced by the American type. The English type had been owned 
by contractors but the American type were owned by farmers. The IUOE was formed 
in case the farm employees who operated the mills became unionised. Although the latter 
has still not happened, the IUOE is kept in place in case unionisation does occur. 
As for the 3 IUOEs who did not reply, we cannot be sure whether they are active 
or not. Information obtained from the Department of Labour indicated that in 2 cases, 
the secretary was probably the wife of a member. In the other case, also, the secretary 
appeared to be a part timer. In view of this, and the fact that none of the 3 IUOEs was 
cited in an award, it seems reasonable to conclude that these 3 IUOEs are inactive too. 
The remaining 104 unions appeared to be active. There were 4 however which, while 
holding meetings and/or providing services to members, did not take part in negotiations. 
One of these was the Auckland Chain Grocers IUOE. Like the other grocers' IUOEs 
referred to above, its award was negotiated by NARGON but the IUOE did hold meet-
ings and provide some services to members. As far as the other IUOEs were concerned, 
the New Zealand Tyre Manufacturers IAOE, stated that its role was only one of co-
ordination. Each member company was registered as an IUOE and negotiated separately. 
One of the others was located at the NZEF but appeared to be virtually nothing. The 
remaining IUOE was located at the offices of a member and, although meetings were held, 
they appeare~ to be mainly concerned with trade association matters such as the prices of 
materials. They did also deal with apprenticeship matters, however, so we did not classify 
them as inactive. Data relating to these 4 unions are included in the tables that follow. 
Low levels of activity were discernable in many other cases. The secretaries of these 
unions admitted frankly that their union was no more than a legal entity set up as a virtual 
requirement of the Industrial Relations Act. 
Activity 
A variety of measures could be used to assess the level of activity of employer unions. 
In this paper, we use 3 broad measures which were obtained from the questionnaire results: 
the union's bargaining arrangements, the frequency of meetings and the services provided 
• 
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to members. We chose not to rely on other measures such as whether the union was cited 
in an award since section 68(5) of the Industrial Relations Act requires that an IUOE or 
IAOE be cited automatically as a respondent to an award whether or not it took part in 
the relevant negotiations. In fact, the only clue to an employer unions involvement ob-
tainable from the Book of Awards is those rare cases where the employer union is the only 
respondent. 
Use of NZEF advocates 
Our measures of activity of employer unions are provided by the data in Tables 3 to 
7. The first of these, Table 3, shows the heavy reliance of employer unions on the NZEF. 
Ninety two percent of responding unions report that they use the advocacy services of the 
NZEF. Needless to say, those located at the NZEF all use NZEF advocates but it is 
interesting that 90 percent of the bifunctional unions separate from the NZEF also use the 
NZEF advocacy services. As it turns out, the organisations least likely to use NZEF 
advocates are unions with premises entirely of their own. Nonetheless, even this group 
had strong links to the NZEF in many respects. Eleven out of the 15 report using NZEF 
advocates and they get NZEF advice when it is needed. These figures show very clearly 
how centralised award bargaining is on the employers' side. Of course the use of an NZEF 
advocate does not automatically give the federation complete control over an organisa-
tion's negotiating stance, since the advocate must accept instructions from those he or she 
represents. There have been occasions on which those instructions differ substantially 
from the NZEF's preferred position. This was sharply illustrated by the negotiation of 
the 1985 electrical contractors' award referred to above. But such instances are the excep-
tion, and there can be no doubting that the near monopoly of NZEF advocates gives the 
. federation considerable control· over the employers' position in wage negotiations. This 
contrasts most markedly with the minimal role played in wage negotiations by the FOL. 
Those unions which negotiate without NZEF advocates belong to certain industries; 
the waterfront, the meat industry and the timber and woodpulp industries. Somewhat 
surprisingly, 2 lesser known unions, the New Zealand Sign Trades IUOE and the Canter-
bury Master Plasterers IUOE, claim to have their own secretaries act as their advocates 
rather than NZEF staff. Some of the larger bifunctional unions which do use the NZEF, 
nonetheless do retain industrial staff who handle a range of issues independently of the 
NZEF. These are explored below (see Table 7). 
Meetings 
A strong indicator of activity among employer unions is the frequency of meetings. 
Data on these are provided in Tables 4 and 5. We determine from Table 4 that only one 
half of employer unions hold meetings of members outside of award time and Table 5 
reveals that 30 percent of unions do not even have meetings of their industrial or manage-
ment committees outside of award time. Again we find the most activity for unions which 
are located away from the NZEF or which are bifunctional. Location away from the 
NZEF is the more important variable. Those away from the NZEF are twice as likely to 
have meetings of members and of the industrial/management committee than NZEF 
unions. Bifunctional unions are half as likely again than single function unions to have 
meetings outside award time. Thus the holding of meetings is most common for those 
unions which are both located away from the NZEF and are bifunctional organisations. 
These comprise one half of employer unions, and two thirds report having membership 
meetings outside award time, and 9 out of 10 report industrial or management committee 
meetings outside· award times. Several of these unions reported monthly meetings of their 
industrial or management committee. 
We must be careful in interpreting these figures. We note below that NZEF-based and 
single function unions take a less reactive bargaining stance. Importantly, as we noted 
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Table 3 : Use of advocacy services of Ne·w Zealand Employers Federation 
Office not at NZEF 
Office at NZEF 
Use services 34 
Do not use services 0 
Not stated 3 
Total 37 
At trade 
Association 
47 
5 
0 
52 
Not at trade 
Association 
11 
3 
1 
15 
Table 4: Meetings of 1nenzbers other than at award negotiation tin1e 
Meetings held outside of award time 
Meetings not held outside of award time 
Not stated 
Total 
Trade association 
At NZEF Not at 
NZEF 
1 34 
5 17 
1 1 
7 52 
Not trade association 
At NZEF 
9 
18 
3 
30 
Not at 
NZEF 
8 
6 
1 
15 
Total 
92 
8 
4 
104 
Total 
52 
46 
6 
104 
Table 5: JHeetings of industrialfnzanagement comnzittee other than at a\vard negotiation 
* 
tbne 
Meetings held outside of award time 
Meetings not held outside of award time 
Not stated 
Total 
Trade association 
At NZEF Not at 
NZEF 
3 46 
3 5 
1 1 
7 52 
Table 6: Frequency of filing counter-clai!ns 
Frequency 
Always 
Sometimes 
Never 
Not stated 
Total 
Trade association 
At NZEF Not at 
NZEF 
3 21 
3 23 
0 8 
1 0 
7 52 
Not trade association 
At NZEF 
13 
16 
1 
30 
Not at 
NZEF 
9 
6 
0 
15 
Not trade association 
At NZEF 
22 
5 
0 
3 
30 
Not at 
NZEF 
8 
4 
2 
1 
15 
Total 
71 
30 
3 
104 
Total 
54 
35 
10 
5 
104 
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above, union meetings are frequently held as adjuncts to meeting of the trade association, 
or union business is added as a minor item to the agenda of the trade association. We find 
that perhaps a half of union membership meetings of bifunctional organisation~ are of this 
type while about a third of industrial or management comn1ittee meetings are held as 
adjuncts to n1eetings of the trade association executive. Nonetheless, by having even this 
limited forum for discussion of industrial relations issues, bifunctional organisations 
provide members and commit tee members with an opportunity to raise particular indus-
trial relations concerns, especially pressing matters. This may not be an ideal situatjon, 
but as Tables 4 and 5 show, it is considerably better than that achieved by the employer 
unions attached to the NZEF. It is of course not surprising that NZEF staff do not hold 
regular membership and committee meetings outside award time. The negotiation of the 
award is the most important function of an employer organisation and, during the term 
of the award, NZEF staff are busy with their own responsibilities. In any event, the 
membership support for such meetings may not be great. But it shows, yet again, how 
weakly organised New Zealand's employers are, and suggests that for any significant level 
of activity to occur it is desirable for an employer union to be bifunctional and to be 
separate from the NZEF, thus providing the framework for this activity. 
Those employer unions who do hold meetings outside award time receive information 
that can serve as the basis for preparing a case for award negotiations. In the absence of 
such meetings during the currency of an award, employer unions are limited in their 
capacity to monitor the problems their members are experiencing with the award. This 
means that negotiating positions must be prepared quickly following meetings at award 
time. Given the pressure of time, it may not be possible to take full a count of members' 
problems. If so, the unions permanent staff and the industrial/management committee 
will do.minate preparations for the award negotiations. For those unions with their office 
at the NZEF, the federation's staff rather than the membership will play the key role. 
This is not to say that NZEF staff do not represent well the members of the unions 
which they organise. Although serving the particular union may be only one of a myriad 
of roles which the relevant NZEF staff member may be called to perform, he or she may 
bring to that job a range of relevant experience in industrial matters which may not be 
possessed by the secretary of a single-function or bifunctional union not attached to the 
NZEF. 
Counter clabns 
An interesting perspective on the bargaining stance of differently organised unions is 
provided by Table 6 which shows the frequency with which the union, on receiving a log 
of claims from a worker union, will ftle a counter claim. We see from the table that unions 
located at the NZEF are more likely to file counter claims. Interestingly, bifunctional 
organisations are less likely to file counter claims. We find that 15 percent of bifunctional 
organisations located separately from the NZEF never file counter claims. In contrast, 
73 percent of the single function unions at the NZEF always file counter claims and an-
other I 7 percent file them sometimes. Thus while bifunctional unions and/or indepen-
dent unions show more activity outside a\vard time, this appears to be offset by a less 
active stand in negotiations. 
Services 
Handling of negotiations is only one of a range of services which employer unions 
provide. The range of services offered is listed in Table 7. In general, employer unions 
tend to confine thernselves to immediate industrial relations concerns. Advisory services 
are the most con1monly provided, with approximately one half of ernployer unions giving 
advice beyond the services offered by the NZEF. One third further assist in the operation 
of dispute machinery and a slightly lesser number represent rnembers before tribunals 
• 
Table 7: Services provided to members 
Service 
General advice 
Legal advice 
Operation of dispute 
machinery 
Industrial relations 
advice 
Representative of members 
before Arbitration Court, 
Human R~hts Commission, 
etc. 
Apprenticeship matters 
Assessment of manpower 
requirements 
Safety services 
Training 
Other 
Total 
Office at 
NZEF 
7 
3 
4 
3 
2 
7 
7 
3 
4 
1 
37 
Office not 
at NZEF 
42 
32 
31 
29 
27 
21 
15 
15 
14 
21 
67 
• 
Office at 
trade 
awclation 
34 
27 
26 
23 
23 
19 
15 
13 
15 
17 
59 
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Office not 
at trade 
a..,ciation 
15 
8 
9 
9 
6 
9 
7 
s 
3 
s 
45 
IAOE IUOE Total 
8 41 49 
• 
8 27 35 
7 28 35 
8 24 32 
6 23 29 
7 21 28 
7 15 22 
6 12 18 
7 11 18 
2 20 22 
13 91 104 
or courts. About one quarter assist with apprenticeship issues and manpower needs, while 
less than 1 in 5 provide safety services or training. Few provide services, such as publica-
tio"ns, beyond those listed in Table 7. If we bear in mind that only a proportion of the 
employer unions deal with apprenticeships at all, the administration of apprenticeships 
is probably the major function for those unions whose members employ apprentices. 
These figures show precisely how moribund New Zealand's employer organisations 
are. It may be that the level of activity is even lower than Table 7 suggests, since due to 
misinterpretation of the question which asked about services additional to those of the 
NZEF, there may be some incidence of over reporting by our respondents. Certainly we 
are confident there is no more activity than the level recorded liere. Gladstone argues that 
the provision of services is a "prime reason" why frrms belong to employer organisations 
and, with the growing complexity of industrial relations, members have even more need for 
those services than they did in the past (Gladstone, 1984, p. 30). But, as we saw in Table 
7, in the main, New Zealand's employer unions provide their members with a minimal level 
of service, and it is unlikely that the level of service provided is an important consideration 
weighing in a firm's decision to join or to continue as a member. The principal factor in 
membership decisions is almost certainly the employer union's role in award negotiation. 
Furthermore, the large fum may well have very little need of the services provided 
by employer organisations. Most major companies in New Zealand have their own 
personnel and/or industrial relations department, and prefer to rely upon their own staff 
for the services which they might otherwise seek from an employer organisation. In 
addition, many such companies have negotiated their own collective agreements with the 
various unions representing their different groups of workers. The administration of these 
agreements is entirely in the hands of company staff and the employer organisations have 
no role to play in this. Indeed, Gladstone notes that in other countries, many medium-
sized and some small companies are developing a competence in this area to match the 
longstanding competence of large frrms (Gladstone, 1984, p. 30) . . 
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However, the personnel function is poorly developed in small New Zealand companies 
and perhaps in a majority of medium-sized companies. Certainly, only a smaD minority 
would be sufficiently well-developed as to be able to perform the range of services noted 
in Table 7. Thus, they depend upon their employer union or the NZEF for the provision 
of these services. It is clear from Table 7 that a great many rums receive very little service 
from their employer union. It seems, for example, quite remarkable that only one half 
provide any advisory services at all to their members, while less than one third claim to 
offer advice dealing specifically with industrial relations. 
This fact may have made an important contribution to the quality of industrial rela-
tions in New Zealand. Worker unions are constantly exhorted to improve their delivery of 
services to their members. It is argued that if worker unions did this, then New Zealand's 
industrial relations would also improve. Indeed, this was one of the major justifications 
advanced by the National Party Government in 1983 for the introduction of voluntary 
unionism (Bolger, 1983). The ·Government claimed that once unions were no longer 
guaranteed their membership and revenues, they would have to service their memberhsip 
considerably better than in the past so as to recruit and retain members. 
If the evidence presented here from the employer side is anything to go by, voluntary 
unionism goes with a rather poor provision of services to members. In fact, one IUOE 
wrote a lengthy and very strongly worded statement on this very issue on the back of the 
questionnaire. The view of this union was that membership of employer unions should 
be compulsory and they were rather resentful of the cold reception they claimed to have 
got when they raised the issue with the NZEF. • 
Size of the employer union is also an important factor and we note that a union is 
more likely to offer extra services if it is a bifunctional union and/or an IAOE than if it 
is single-function union or an IUOE. A further factor is whether or not the union is 
located at the NZEF. 
It is plain from Table 7 that members of employer organisations based at the NZEF 
receive the lowest level of services from their own union. In one sense, however, this is 
slightly misleading in that for some services (e.g. operation of dispute macllinery, represen-
tation of members before courts and tribunals), it may be unnecessary to provide any 
service beyond that already provided by the NZEF. But for some other services, especially 
the range of advisory services, members may be disadvantaged by not receiving assistance 
or advice specific to the industry or occupation concerned. And, as we noted with regard 
to the frequency of meetings, it is not surprising that NZEF-based organisations offer the 
lowest level of services. As a practical matter, it is difficult for NZEF staff to be very 
active in providing additional services to the members of individual unions. The traditional 
resistance of the NZEF to the development of industrial relations services being provided 
by trade associations (Rudman, 1974, p. 67) has thus not been overly successful but, 
more than that, it may have led to a less satisfactory level of advice for a proportion of the 
membership of employer unions. 
Conclusion 
The results of our 2 surveys of registered IUOEs and IAOEs has revealed how 
moribund the majority of employer unions are. Many were found to be completely 
inactive and even those that were active reported low levels of activity. It was clear in 
some cases that the secretaries of the unions were barely aware of their position and 
confused the union with an associated trade association. Such activity as some of these 
unions displayed tended to be associated with trade matters or apprenticeships rather 
than industrial matters per se. These findings confum Rudman's earlier claims that most 
have been formed solely to enable employers "to become applicants in a dispute, and 
thereby maintain the national coverage of an award ... and ... they are for all intents 
and purposes 'legal fictions' "(Rudman, 1974, p. 68-69). 
The second survey concentrated on the more active unions - IAOEs and IUOEs 
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without an IAOE affiliation. Although nearly all these engaged in bargaining, we found 
that only one half held membership meetings outside of award time and that 30 percent 
did not even have their management or industrial committees meet outside award time. 
Such meetings as were held were sometimes simultaneous to, or tagged onto the end of, a 
trade association meeting. The provision of services beyond those provided by the New 
Zealand Employers Federation was also found to be very limited. 
The focal role of the NZEF is an interesting one. One third of all IAOEs and 
unaffiliated IUOEs are located at the NZEF and all but a handful of employer unions draw 
on the NZEF's advocacy services. NZEF-based unions on the whole, though, are less 
active. They are less likely to have meetings and to provide additional services. On the 
other hand, they are more likely to make counter claims as part of the negotiation pro-
cess. It would appear that handing the secretaryship of the union to· the NZEF, while 
going with a lower membership involvement, means a more professional service and a 
more aggressive bargaining stance. 
More than one half of employer unions are attached to trade associations, bifunctional 
unions, and it was clear that these unions display the highest levels of activity. Trade 
associations provide a financial and administrative base for a union and are able to provide 
specialised services beyond those of the NZEF. Although a few bifunctional unions are 
located at the NZEF, most are not and still represent the majority of unions. These unions 
do have strong links to the NZEF, though, since NZEF advocates act for virtually all of 
them in negotiations. 
Many employers may see the NZEF's dominance of employer bargaining as a good 
thing but the price may be a lower level of activity among employer unions than ought 
to be the case. The inactivity among employer unions which this study has reported is 
partly due to the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act which encourage the forma-
tion and continued existence of employer unions but, at the same time, restrict their 
roles and range of services to members; but it is also due to the dominance of the NZEF 
which spoonfeeds many employer unions. If employer unions were to become more active 
we may see more realistic bargaining and better industrial relations. The current institu-
tional arrangements make such a transition an unlikely development . 
• 
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